Jurisprudence

Définition d’un co-inventeur (É.-U.)

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Dans l’affaire “HIP, Inc., v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2022-1696, — F.4th — (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2023)“, la Cour Fédérale américaine rappelle la définition de co-inventeur:

(1) contributed in some significant manner to the conception of the invention;

(2) made a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention; and

(3) did more than merely explain to the real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art. 

Une cour américaine confirme la possibilité d’inclure dans des revendications des éléments non illustrés dans les dessins

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Dans Skedco v. Strategic Operations (StOps), la ‘United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’ a confirmé la capacité des demandeurs de revendiquer des éléments non montrés par dessins dans une demande de brevet:

“[I]t is the claims, not the written description, which define the scope of the patent right.” Laitram Corp v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Patents do not need to include drawings of particular embodiments in order to claim them. See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For this reason, a claim is not limited to inventions looking like those in the drawings. MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This guidance is especially apt here because the patent refers to the drawings to which StOps points as “exemplary embodiment[s].”

Brevet au Canada: la définition de “divulgation publique” se précise

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Federal Court of Appeal – Wenzel Downhole Tools Ltd. v. National-Oilwell Canada Ltd.

“Being available for consultation is not the same as disclosing information. “

“…information cannot be deemed to have been available to the public unless it is established by positive evidence that it was indeed conveyed to the public by some form of communication.

Une divulgation orale d’une invention crée de l’art antérieur aux États-Unis

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Dans la cause Amkor Technology, Inc. c. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2012), on a statué qu’une divulgation orale d’une invention en sol américain crée de l’art antérieur aux États-Unis sous 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) .

“…content of the domestic disclosure must be specific enough to encompass the “complete and operative invention…and an inventor’s oral testimony to this extent is a question of proof. “

 

US – Idée Abstraite + Ordinateur = Non brevetable

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Dans Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.), Fed. Cir., No. 2011-1467, la Federal Circuit a statué qu’une revendication d’un système incluant un ordinateur mettant en oeuvre des étapes évidentes permettant de résoudre un problème plus rapidement n’est pas brevetable.

As we have explained, “[s]imply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible.” …

To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not. … Thus, as we held in Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease LLC, [671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012)], the limitation “using a computer” in an otherwise abstract concept did not “ ‘play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed.’ ” … The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.

 

Brevet au Canada – Attention aux fausses promesses

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*Ce qu’il faut retenir:

Un brevet ne devrait contenir aucune phrase ou expression relative à un objectif, une promesse, un but, etc.

** Pour les praticiens en PI:

La décision Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC v. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. concerne des allégations par Mylan à l’effet que le brevet canadien No. 1,337,420 d’ AstraZeneca serait invalide, entre autre, pour manque d’utilité. (“lack of utility”). Plus précisemment, la question est à savoir i) si l’expression suivante constitue une promesse:

It is a particular object of the present invention to provide aromatase inhibitory compounds with fewer undesirable side effects than [AG].

ii) si c’est le cas, si la promesse a été remplie, iii) et si une promesse non remplie constitue un motif pour invalider un brevet.

Selon le juge Evans:

[33] I agree with the Judge that an examination of the patent as a whole supports the conclusion that, unlike the express claims of the patent, the object clause contains no more than a forward-looking aim of the invention. In my view, the fact that side effects are not mentioned elsewhere in the patent is telling.

Le juge p/r à l’interprétation du mot “provide”:

[31] Mylan counters these arguments by saying that the word “provide”, which appears in the object clause, is used elsewhere in the patent in connection with the claims of the patent. Thus, by stating that “it is a particular object of the invention to provide aromatase inhibitory compounds with fewer undesirable side effects than [AG]”, the object clause should, counsel argues, be interpreted as a promise.

[32] I do not agree. In my view, this microscopic approach to the construction of the provisions of a patent is misguided. The fact that such an ordinary word as “provide” is used in sentences containing the claims of the patent does not mean that when used in other sentences, it should be construed as connoting a promise of the patent.

 

US: Attention de ne pas prévoir un ordinateur à usage général sans en avoir les moyens

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Pour les praticiens en PI

 

Dans Ergo Licensing v. CareFusion 303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) la Federal Circuit des États-Unis a déterminé:

If special programming is required for a general purpose computer to perform the corresponding claimed function, then the default rule requiring disclosure of an algorithm applies. It is only in the rare circumstances where any general-purpose computer without any special programming can perform the function that an algorithm need not be disclosed.

Thus, the means-plus-function limitation has no corresponding structure in the specification because “there is no algorithm described in any form for the function of ‘controlling the adjusting means.'” As a result, the claim is invalid as indefinite.

 

 

Pour être valide, un brevet US portant sur une méthode d’affaires doit faire plus que mentionner la présence d’un ordinateur

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Pour en savoir plus:

Dans Dealertrack v. Huber (Fed. Cir. 2012) , une méthode pour gérer une demande de crédit est jugée non brevetable par la Court of Appeal of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) parce qu’elle concernerait une idée abstraite qui couvrirait un concept fondamental qui brimerait toute innovation dans le domaine concerné (“the claims” are directed to an abstract idea preemptive of a fundamental concept or idea that would foreclose innovation in this area).

Selon la cour:

– “The claims are silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method. The undefined phrase “computer aided” is no less abstract than the idea of a clearinghouse itself.”

– “Simply adding a computer aided limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible.”

La revendication 1…:

Continuer la lecture

Rappel: Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo (brevet-US)

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Pour les praticiens en PI

Dans la cause PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC. v. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES (628 F.3d 1347 (2010)) la Cour d’Appel fédérale des US se penche sur la question de la matière brevetable.

Selon la cour, la méthode de traitement brevetée satisfait le test “machine-or-transformation”. Bien que la cour reconnait qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un test exclusif dans un contexte Post Bilski , selon ellece test fournie d’importantes indices quand au caractère brevetable du sujet en question:

“...claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative when one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.”

“…”determining” step to be transformative because it involves “[s]ome form of manipulation, such as the high pressure liquid chromatography method specified in several of the asserted dependent claims or some other modification of the substances to be measured, [which] is necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily sample and determine their concentration.“

Concernant les “mental steps”:

“A subsequent mental step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.”

Reminder: No exclusions in Canada for “Business Method Patents”

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According to “AMAZON.COM, INC. vs THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, and THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS“:

“[61] There is no basis for the Commissioner’s assumption that there is a “tradition” of excluding

business methods from patentability in Canada. The only Canadian jurisprudence cited was made as

obiter and in dissent by Arbour J. in Schmeiser.”

“[69] The Commissioner’s decision introduced one more novel and unnecessary requirement for

patentability into the Canadian patent regime: the technical or technological requirement. She also

suggests that “new and useful knowledge” must be “scientific or technological” in order to

constitute a patentable art. Thus, according to this reasoning, one must now assess whether an

invention : and specifically what has been added to human knowledge : is technological in nature.”

“[70] In fairness, in this instance the Commissioner does glean some of her rationale from the

language in the Patent Rules and Canadian jurisprudence, but this does not translate into an

endorsement or imposition of a “technical test”. There is no reference to such a test in the Canadian

jurisprudence (or none was advanced in this Court). It was not within the Commissioner’s

jurisdiction to introduce one. Once again, the Commissioner’s heavy reliance on the “technical

contribution approach” as discussed in the UK did not correspond with the reality of our Patent Act

or recognize the range of opinions as to its application and appropriateness…”

With regards to the specific Amazon patent application, Amazon’s invention qualified under s. 2 because (1) the system claims require a machine as an essential element of the invention and (2) the method claims are “put the into action through the use of cookies, computers, the internet and the customer’s own action” and results in a “physical effect” on those elements.